

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 8 November 1950 STAT

FROM : Bob Komer

SUBJECT: Contribution to Sec. III of outline on Project Kilroy

1. It is impossible to divorce US policy toward Germany from US policy toward Western Europe of which our German policy is an integral part. The most important single element of our foreign policy is to build up a viable and defensible Western Europe, first to prevent its absorption into the Soviet sphere and second to use it eventually as a counterweight against the USSR (both we and the Soviets recognize that Western Europe is the only area with an immediately realizable power potential which can tip the balance between East and West). We consider West Germany a vital element in this structure, both because of (1) positive military and economic importance to Western Europe and, (2) the negative necessity of preventing any German rapprochement with the USSR. Indeed we and all other NAT countries now recognize that without a major German contribution it will be impossible to create an adequate European defense force in the shortest possible time.

2. Therefore, our present German policy is:

A. To remove all remaining controls as rapidly as feasible and to restore West Germany to a position of equality. While we see the desirability and indeed the political necessity (because of French fears) of retaining certain controls, we undoubtedly are prepared to remove them all in due time.

B. To tie Germany as fully as possible to the West through a growing number of common institutions and obligations on a European and broader scale. Thus we favor full German participation in the Schuman Plan and all other schemes for greater European unification, plus eventual full German membership in the NAT.

C. To aid German economic and, within limits, military recovery as part of the overall US effort to revive Western Europe; we will probably favor, say, five German divisions by the end of 1951, ten by the end of 1952, and twenty by 1954.

All other NAT countries support these policies, except for the hesitancy of France. While the French accept the eventual revival of West Germany as an equal, they would modify its progress toward that goal in order to prevent Germans from ever again becoming a menace to France.

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3. The future effect of a successful US policy in Germany and in Europe will be to shift the balance of power in Europe from overwhelmingly in favor of the USSR, as at present, to at first an equal basis and eventually in favor of the West (in particular, a successful and safe revival of Germany within a wider European context will provide the margin of superiority which almost assures the success of our wider European design). In the first instance, it would write finis to Soviet hopes of internal subversion and/or military conquest of Western Europe; in the longer run it would have serious implications for continued Soviet control of their own sphere. A revived Western Germany, backed by a revived and rearmed Western Europe (and the US) would exert a powerful attraction on East Germany. Moreover, in reversing the present power position, it would enable the West to begin putting pressure on the other Satellite states. Finally, it would ultimately reduce the US burden of aiding Europe and permit us to divert resources to Asia and the Near East.

On the other hand, if the Soviets could succeed in neutralizing Germany, or at least in delaying and hampering its revival and Westward orientation, this would seriously postpone the successful realization of our objective, if not preventing it entirely, and would complicate the whole problem by introducing Germany as a third and uncertain factor into the European balance of power.

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